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This paper analyzes changes in the allocation of child 
labor within the household in reaction to exogenous 
shocks created by a social program in Nicaragua. The 
paper shows that households that randomly received a 
conditional cash transfer compensated for some of the 
intra-household differences, as they reduced child labor 
more for older boys who used to work more and for boys 
who were further behind in school. The results also show 
that households that randomly received a productive 
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investment grant, in addition to the basic conditional 
cash transfer benefits, both targeted at women, show an 
increased specialization of older girls in nonagricultural 
and domestic work, but no overall increase in girls’ 
child labor. The findings suggest that time allocation 
and specialization patterns in child labor within the 
household are important factors to understand the 
impact of a social program. 
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Child labor in developing countries is a topic of debate and concern for many 
policy makers.  The literature on child labor has discussed the complicated trade-offs that 
are often involved in parental decision-making on child labor, and has shed light on how 
various household characteristics and different contexts might affect such decisions 
(Basu, 1999; Edmonds, 2007). Less is known about child-specific characteristics parents 
take into account when assigning responsibilities for the various work tasks within the 
household. Parents’ decisions could either reinforce existing differences between children 
by investing more in those children that have accumulated higher human capital or more 
natural or social endowments, or they could compensate for deficiencies through targeted 
investments. A positive shock might lead households to compensate for or reinforce 
existing differences. To the extent that such investments compete with, or possibly 
complement, children’s time working, we would expect this to be reflected in the intra-
household child labor allocations.  
This paper therefore aims at analyzing how the allocation of tasks among children 
within a household changes in response to a social program. It first shows that child-
specific characteristics can help shed light on the allocation tasks among children in a 
household. It then analyzes whether the exogenous shocks created by a social program 
resulted in compensation or reinforcement of pre-program differences in child labor 
allocation and human capital accumulation.  
The program we analyze is called Atencion a Crisis, a conditional cash transfer 
program (CCT) in Nicaragua. Women in randomly selected treatment communities 
received a bi-monthly sizable cash transfer conditional on school enrollment and 
attendance of primary school children. A random subset of the beneficiaries in addition 
received a grant aimed at increasing their productive capacity in a nonagricultural 
activity. The empirical identification strategy in this paper relies on this two-staged 
randomized design to analyze the various factors that might affect child labor allocation. 
  2To understand the intra-household allocations specifically, we use a household fixed 
effects model. This allows controlling for the many observed and unobserved household 
characteristics that might affect child labor.  
In order to shed light on the intra-household child labor allocation, we consider 
not only the total amount of hours worked, but also the composition of labor by 
disaggregating work in hours by various non-domestic and domestic activities. Edmonds 
(2006) and Kruger and Berthelon (2007) have demonstrated that the inclusion of 
domestic work can be key to shed light on gender differences, as girls might be 
disproportionately assigned to domestic tasks. The differentiation between different tasks 
is also important as some tasks are more likely to compete with schooling in terms of 
timing, while parents could consider experience in other tasks as complementary to 
human capital investment through schooling. This could be the case because some child 
labor might result in learning new skills---such as counting and handling money in a 
small shop or engaging in commerce while selling goods in the community (Edmonds, 
2007), or learning about agricultural practices which might increase future returns in 
agriculture (Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti, 2006).  
Studies that analyze intra-household differences in child labor mainly focus on 
heterogeneity by birth order (Behrman and Taubman, 1986; Edmonds, 2006; Ejrnaes and 
Portner, 2004; Emerson and Souza, 2008; Manacorda, 2006).
1 Intra-household 
heterogeneity along other characteristics has received less attention. Yet, there is a large 
related literature on intra-household differences in investments in education, health and 
nutrition (Behrman, Pollack and Taubman, 1986; Das Gupta, 1987; Rosenzweig and 
Schultz, 1992; Foster, 1995). Differences in intra-household bargaining power between 
spouses often can lead to differences in resource spending between children of the same 
household (Thomas, 1997; Duflo, 2003). This can be reinforced by households coping 
mechanisms in the face of negative shocks. (Behrman, 1988; Behrman and Deolalikar 
1988). Vice versa, a positive income shock can help to compensate for existing 
                                                 
1 To our knowledge, other studies analyzing the impact of similar conditional cash transfer programs on 
child labor do not consider the intra-household re-allocation of child labor, though they do shed light on 
heterogeneity of child labor impacts along gender and age categories (see Skoufias and Parker, 2001 for 
evidence on Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico, and Maluccio, 2003 for the Red de Proteccion Social in 
Nicaragua). Filmer and Schady (2008) show that a somewhat different conditional fellowship program 
targeted at individual children and involving much smaller cash transfers reduced child labor for eligible 
children, and did not affect work of ineligible siblings.  
  3differences (Rose, 1999; Mansuri, 2006). Finally, Rangel (2008) provides striking 
evidence that expected return can affect parental decisions, as he finds that skin color 
helps explain differences in human capital investments between siblings in Brazil.   
In this paper, we first consider whether the program helped to compensate for 
existing imbalances in child labor along gender lines. We then analyze whether the 
program helped parents to compensate for lags in academic achievement by reducing 
child labor more for children with lower past academic achievement.  Both gender and 
past academic achievement are factors that parents are likely to take into account when 
considering the returns to schooling and the assignment of different child labor tasks 
within the household.  
If parents decide on child labor allocations according to the expected returns, 
existing specialization patterns in society that require boys and girls to be prepared for 
different types of tasks might matter for child labor allocation. However, in the presence 
of a social intervention, the expected returns can change, potentially favoring children 
who would not be favored in regular circumstances.  This is particularly the case given 
that CCTs give families direct transfers conditional on all primary-school-age children 
attending school. In addition, in households that received the productive investment 
package, women are likely to dedicate themselves more to nonagricultural economic 
tasks. This might increase returns to girls’ labor in these nonagricultural activities, but 
also in domestic tasks to the extent they need to substitute for their mother’s work.  
Parents also may consider past academic achievement when considering returns to 
both specific child labor tasks and returns to further schooling, which can compete with 
child labor. Past academic achievement is likely to capture a combination of innate ability 
and accumulated skills, which might be the result of past disadvantages, negative shocks, 
and investment decisions that may have affected different children in the households 
differently.
2 It is a priori unclear whether the positive program income shock linked with 
the conditionalities would lead to compensation or reinforcement of existing differences. 
Parents may reduce child labor more for children without lags and exacerbate intra-
household differences, or they could decrease child labor more for children with existing 
                                                 
2 The dataset does not contain baseline test-scores for the vast majority of the children in the sample. We 
therefore rely on this proxy measure of past academic achievement to capture unobserved ability and 
accumulated skill.  
  4lags, possibly helping to compensate for past delays. While academic achievement is a 
measure of both innate ability and accumulated skill, this question relates to the debate on 
parents human capital decisions as a response to innate abilities. Becker (1991) predicts 
that parents will invest more in the human capital of abler children, but, in the case of 
rich families, parents make compensatory transfers to less able children. Empirical results 
for the US are mixed, as some find that parents compensate for deficiencies in children’s 
endowments or prejudices from cultural biases (Becker and Tomes 1976; Wilhelm, 1996; 
Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998; Ermish and Francesconi, 2000), while other results suggest 
that investments by parents reinforce genetic endowment (whether intelligence or gender) 
and/or labor-market biases (Kim, 2005).  
This paper first shows that child labor is distributed unequally within the 
household, and that there appear to be clear patterns of specialization. In particular, while 
total amount of hours worked do not differ significantly by gender, boys work more 
hours than girls in economic activities, and this difference comes primarily from work in 
agriculture. Girls work more in domestic activities and livestock. The trade-off between 
schooling and work appears to be stronger for boys, possibly due to the specialization in 
agriculture that competes, in terms of when the activity takes place, more directly with 
schooling. Intriguingly however, children that are attending school are more likely to 
work in nonagricultural activities than their siblings.  
The paper then shows that the program helped compensate for some of these 
intra-household differences, but exacerbated others. In particular, it reduced total hours 
worked more for older boys, and for boys with low past academic achievements. 
Households that, in addition to the CCT, randomly received the productive investment 
grant show an increased specialization of older girls in nonagricultural and domestic 
work, but no overall increase in older girls’ child labor. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Part II provides the necessary 
background on the program and its randomization. In part III we turn to the data, discuss 
the patterns in intra-household labor allocation, and derive hypotheses related to the 
program impact. In part IV we present the main results of the paper, and show how the 
program impacts differ between siblings with different gender and with differences in 
past academic achievements. Part V concludes.  
  5 
II. Background on the Program 
II.1. Program design 
The  Atención a Crisis program was a one-year pilot program implemented 
between November 2005 and December 2006 by the Ministry of the Family in 
Nicaragua.
3 The program was implemented in the aftermath of a severe drought and had 
two objectives. First, it aimed to serve as a short-run safety net by reducing the impact of 
the aggregate shock on human and physical capital investments. This was facilitated via 
cash transfers, which were envisioned to reduce the need for ex-post, adverse coping 
mechanisms, such as asset sales, taking children out of school or reductions in food 
consumption. Second, the program also intended to promote long run upward mobility 
and poverty reduction through asset creation by enhancing households’ asset base and 
income diversification capacity.
 4 
  In order to achieve these objectives, and building on the already existing and 
successful conditional cash transfer model in Nicaragua (Red de Protección Social - 
RPS), the program introduced 3 different packages in order to evaluate and compare the 
effectiveness of each to reach the objectives stated above. Specifically, a total of 3,000 
households were selected to participate in the program. These households were allocated 
one of three different packages through a participatory lottery, organized in each 
community: (i) the basic CCT; (ii) the basic CCT plus a scholarship for an occupational 
training; and (iii) the basic CCT plus a grant for productive investments. 
  All selected beneficiary households received the basic CCT consisting of cash 
transfers conditional on children’s primary school and health service attendance. In 
addition to the CCT, one third of the beneficiary households also received a scholarship 
that allowed one of the household members to choose among a number of vocational 
training courses offered in the municipal headquarters. However, due to implementation 
delays, the vocational training courses had not started yet at the moment of the follow-up 
                                                 
3 For an extensive description of the program and evaluation design see Macours and Vakis (2005, 2008). 
4 Macours and Vakis (2008) show that the program increased school enrollment and attendance, and that 
beneficiary households of the productive investment package had higher incomes from nonagricultural self-
employment. Del Carpio (2008) shows that the program led to a shift of child labor to such nonagricultural 
activities, and an overall decline in total child labor hours.  
  6survey. Finally, another third of the beneficiary households received, in addition to the 
basic CCT, a grant for productive investments aimed at encouraging recipients to start a 
small non-agricultural activity with the goal of asset creation and income diversification. 
This grant was conditional on the household developing a business development plan, 
outlining the investments outside of subsistence farming in new livestock or non-
agricultural income generating activities. This package included technical assistance and 
training in basic commercial skills. The beneficiaries of the productive investment 
package had received the largest amount of benefits at the moment of the follow-up 
survey: 2-3 months before being surveyed they had received $175 to invest.
5  
 
II.2. Program  randomization 
The program was targeted to 6 municipalities of the drought region in the 
northwest of Nicaragua. These were municipalities that met both criteria of having been 
affected by a drought the previous year and by the high prevalence of extreme rural 
poverty based on the national poverty map. From the list of all communities in the 6 
municipalities, 56 intervention and 50 control communities were randomly selected 
through a lottery to which the mayors of the 6 municipalities were invited to attend and 
participate. Baseline data were then used to define program eligibility based on poverty 
and vulnerability, resulting in the identification of 3,000 households to participate in the 
program.
6 Finally, from each eligible household, the female household member that was 
reported as the children’s primary caregiver was invited to a registration assembly.
7 At 
the end of each assembly, all the beneficiaries participated in a lottery process through 
                                                 
5 The remaining $25 was to be paid on the next payment day (after survey completion). 
6 The eligibility criteria were determined using the proxy means methodology developed for the RPS and 
based on the national household data from 2001 (EMNV). Additional discussions with local leaders from 
each intervention community were conducted to identify possible exclusion or inclusions errors. Based on 
this, the list of eligible households was finalized. Based on the discussions with leaders, 3.72% of all the 
households considered were re-assigned from non-eligible to eligible, and 3.65% from eligible to non-
eligible. To avoid any possible selection bias resulting from the re-assignment by the leaders, all estimates 
in this paper are intent-to treat estimates, using the intent-to-treat as defined by the proxy means 
methodology.  
7 Only in the few cases that there was no adult female in the household, an adult man was selected as the 
program recipient.  
  7which the three packages described above were randomly allocated among the eligible 
households.
8  
Table 1 presents the randomization results for the sample of eligible households 
with children between 6 and 15 years old.
9 The differences between households in 
treatment and control communities are small and not statistically significant. Similarly, 
the differences between households with the productive investment package and 
households in the control communities are generally small and not significant.  
 
III. Data, Descriptive Patterns, and Hypotheses 
III.1. Data 
The data comes from a household panel in the control and treatment communities. 
In treatment communities, data were collected from all households. In control 
communities, a random sample of households was selected to obtain a control group of 
equal size as each of the three intervention groups (of about 1000 households). The 
follow-up data was collected 9 months after the start of the program. The attrition rate of 
the second round was 1.3 percent of the original households.
10 The attrition is 
uncorrelated with treatment.  
  The main household survey, collected in both rounds, contains household and 
individual level data on various socio-economic indicators on approximately 4400 
households. In the follow-up survey, additional questions on child labor were added, to 
capture in particular children’s work in chores (wood and water gathering) and domestic 
work. The quantitative data was complemented with qualitative work, based on focus 
groups and semi-structured interviews with a wide set of beneficiaries and other local 
actors in treatment and control communities (see Aguilera et al., 2006). 
 
III.2. Child labor allocation patterns   
                                                 
8 Participation by the invited beneficiaries to the assemblies and lotteries was near 100%.  
9 Take-up of the overall program among eligible households was 95%, with the main attrition due to 
exclusion by leaders (see footnote 6). Take-up of the productive investment grant among households in the 
program was near 100%.  
10 The low attrition rate was the result of tracking both households and individual household members that 
had moved since the baseline.  
  8Before considering the program impact, we describe the child labor patterns in the 
control communities.
11 Child labor is measured in number of hours worked per week in 
economic activities, chores and domestic activities. Economic activities include labor in 
agricultural and livestock activities, as well as labor in nonagricultural activities.
12 Child 
labor in agricultural and livestock mostly consists of help with the crops or livestock self-
employment activities of the household, but also includes wage labor in agriculture. 
Labor in nonagricultural activities consists of help by children in the commercial or 
manufacturing self-employment activities of the household, or possibly wage-
employment outside of agriculture. Chores consist of wood or water gathering, and 
domestic activities include cooking, cleaning, washing and caring for younger siblings. 
Table 2 shows that including chores and domestic work is important as they constitute a 
large part of child labor. 
  Table 2 further shows very clear gender patterns in the allocation of child labor 
within the household.
13 Boys work more hours in economic activities, in particular 
agriculture, and also spend more time carrying water and wood. On the other hand, girls 
work more hours in domestic activities. As a result, there are no significant differences 
between girls and boys in total number of hours worked. The table shows that boys work 
on average almost 2.5 hours per week more than their sisters in economic activities. The 
difference between boys and girls falls to less than an hour, and is not significant, when 
chores and domestic activities are included. Overall, these patterns suggest within-
household specialization along gender lines.
14  
  Not surprisingly, the data also indicate that older children work more hours than 
younger children.  Given that the age of the child and possibly gender might be correlated 
with other variables of interest (such as school attendance and grade achievement), we 
                                                 
11 We use the control, instead of the baseline, for the descriptive statistics, as information on child labor in 
chores and domestic work was not collected in the baseline survey. For the other variables, descriptive 
patterns in the baseline are similar to those described for the control communities at follow-up.  
12 There is a small number of observations for which the total hours in economic activity is known, but it is 
unclear whether the hours were dedicated to nonagricultural or agricultural work. As a result, the 
coefficients of hours in nonagricultural activities, agriculture, and livestock in the tables do not add up 
exactly to the coefficient of hours in total economic activity.  
13 In order to look within the household, we regressed each of the child labor outcomes on a gender dummy 
and a household fixed effect. 
14 The intra-household patterns are consistent and somewhat stronger than the inter-household differences 
between boys and girls. 
  9normalize the outcome variables by regressing each outcome on a series of dummies for 
age (in months) by gender for the control. For outcomes used in the fixed effect 
estimates, we also include household fixed effects in these estimations. We then obtain 
the residual by subtracting the estimated outcome for each category from the observed 
measure. In the rest of the paper we use these measures to analyze how child labor hours 
differ from the average number of hours of a child of the same gender and age. 
  Given the schooling conditionality, we analyze whether school attendance and 
child labor appear to compete for children’s time. Table 3 shows that, after accounting for 
differences in age and gender, children who attend school indeed work on average 4 
hours less per week. Children work in particular almost 3 hours less in agriculture, with 
the remaining hour mainly coming from chores and domestic work. Intriguingly 
however, school-going children work more in nonagricultural activities. None of these 
differences capture any household level variation, as the fixed effects control for 
household socio-economic status and other household unobservables. A possible 
explanation of the finding on nonagricultural activities is related to the low education 
levels of the parents whom might need the help of school going children for basic math 
and accounting necessary in such activities.
15  
  Table 3 also shows results for boys and girls separately, and indicates that the 
negative correlation between child labor in economic activities and school attendance is 
completely driven by the results for boys. Girls work equal amounts in economic 
activities, whether they are attending school or not, but boys work on average almost 6 
hours less when they attend school. This hence suggests that for boys, school and work 
might be substitutes, while this is much less the case for girls. This is consistent with the 
timing of work in agriculture—which occurs mainly in the mornings at the same time of 
classes—and with the specialization of girls and boys in different tasks.  
  Finally, table 4 shows that there are no significant differences in child labor 
allocation between children who are below grade level, and their siblings who are at 
grade level. The relationship between past academic achievement and child labor hence 
does not appear to be straightforward.  
 
                                                 
15 The average education level of household heads is 2.7 years.  
  10III.3. Hypotheses 
Does the Atencion a Crisis program strengthen or offset existing child labor 
allocation patterns within the households? The answer likely depends on a number of 
program design features.  First, the cash component of the program might reduce the need 
for child labor and might do so more for certain activities in which boys specialize. It is 
possible for instance, that the cash would be used to hire day laborers in agriculture that 
could substitute for the boys’ work. Second, the school conditionality related to the 
program, together with the cash that allows buying school materials, might increase 
enrollment and attendance to school, and therefore reduce the number of hours the 
children can work. This might have a larger impact on those children that would have 
been working more in the absence of the program.  The descriptive results hence would 
suggest that both the cash and the conditionality might affect work hours of older boys in 
particular, and as such possibly reduce the gender discrepancies.   
  On the other hand, the program was targeted to women, and women were the 
direct beneficiaries of the cash, which could possibly lead to a higher reduction of child 
labor for girls (Emerson and Portela Souza, 2007).  Yet the program – and in particular 
the productive investment package – might also lead to an increased need for help in 
nonagricultural activities. These are activities in which older girls tend to specialize, and 
it is unclear whether the increased demand for labor would reinforce or weaken this 
specialization pattern.  Households with the productive investment package possibly also 
have an increased need for help with domestic work. As the female beneficiary takes up 
her new activity, this could affect older girls in the household, and lead to a 
reinforcement of the age and gender patterns.  Also, given low levels of literacy in the 
region, adult program participants might need to rely on children with more advanced 
math skills (higher schooling levels) for help with the accounting part of the new activity.  
  Finally, the finding that there are no significant differences in child labor between 
children who are at grade level versus those that are behind, might indicate that on 
average parents do not put extra labor burden on children that have fallen behind in 
school. This could be because higher ability or accumulated skill can increase both the 
return to child labor and the return to schooling, or because higher ability or accumulated 
skill can make it easier for children to combine both. If this is the case, one might expect 
  11that the additional cash combined with the conditionalities might help parents to 
compensate for past lags in academic achievement.  
 
IV. Impact of Atencion a Crisis on Intra-household Child Labor Allocation 
  Given that the decision-making in households with the productive investment 
package needs to account for a number of additional factors, we analyze both the impact 
on the intra-household allocation of all households from the treatment communities, and 
the impacts of households with the third package specifically. We rely on the randomized 
design, and estimate the impacts using simple differences between the treatment and 
control households. Hence let 
 
Yij = β + β Ti + β Xij + β TiXij +ηi +εij 
 
where Yij is the child labor hours (in a specific type of activity) for child j in household i 
corrected for any gender-specific age-trends based on the estimated trends for the control 
group. T is a dummy variable indicating the intent-to-treat for household i, Xij a key 
characteristic of child j in household i that could affect child labor allocation (gender or 
past academic achievement), ηi captures all unobservable characteristics of household i, 
while εij captures the unobservable characteristics of child j in household i.  
We estimate the model using household fixed effects, implying that both the term 
βTi and ηi cancel out. The estimate of β , the coefficient of interaction of the intent-to-
treat dummy with the various variables of interest then shed light on the intra-household 
reallocation in child labor. The model hence allows isolating the heterogeneity in impacts 
within households along a number of dimensions, while controlling for all unobservable 
household factors. We first consider differences between children of different gender, and 
then focus on whether past academic achievement of the child is related to differences in 
program impact within the household.  
 As  the  βTi term cancels out when we include household fixed effects, we also 
estimate a random effects model in order to facilitate the interpretation of the estimate 
forβ . All standard errors are corrected for clustering at the community level.  
 
  12IV.1. Gender: compensation and specialization 
Table 5 sheds light on the reallocation of child labor within the household as a 
result of the intervention. The top panel shows that child labor decreases more for boys 
than for girls, and this is primarily the result of larger decreases for boys in agriculture 
and livestock activities. Both child labor in all economic activities and total child labor 
reduce more for boys than for girls, leading to a reduction of the gaps in total numbers 
worked with 1.5 hours.  
  When accounting for heterogeneity by age when considering gender differences 
in impact, it becomes clear that the reductions in agriculture, livestock, domestic work 
and total work are particularly large for older boys, when compared to their siblings.  In 
contrast, impact on child labor allocation for older girls does not seem to be bigger than 
for their younger sisters, and there is some indication of an increase in domestic work, 
relative to their younger sisters.
16  Yet, in terms of total hours worked the impact for girls 
does not increase or decrease significantly as age increases, which contrasts the results 
found for boys.  
  Table 6 shows that the finding that child labor decreases more for boys than for 
girls is robust to different alternative specifications, including 1) controlling for age and 
gender trends in the regression instead of measuring the dependent variable as a deviation 
from the age-gender specific mean; and 2) including only households that have some 
child labor. The latter robustness check addresses a potential truncation concern. Note 
first that because the dependent variable is measured as deviations from the mean for 
children of the same age and gender in the control, there is no clear truncation in this 
variable. Nevertheless, there might be a concern related to truncation at 0 of the original 
child labor variables. Specification 2 excludes all the households where no children were 
working, to shed some light on this issue. As can be seen there are actually relatively few 
households (about 68 out of 1594) where none of the children work, and results are quite 
similar than the estimates on the full sample. As another robustness check, we have 
estimated the random effects model using tobit and without first demeaning the 
                                                 
16 The estimates in the random effects model (lower panel) suggest that the program reduced domestic work 
for young girls, but increased the number of hours dedicated to domestic work for older girls. This does not 
however translate in a significant overall increase of work for them. On the other hand, the point estimates 
in the first column shows that the number of hours in nonagricultural work increased for both boys and 
girls.  
  13dependent variable (with bootstrapped standard errors to correct for clustering at the 
community level), which shows significant effects that are quite similar in magnitude to 
those from the OLS model: the gender difference in impact in all economic activity is -
1.9 and in overall work -1.4 compared to -1.8 and -1.5 respectively in the OLS random 
effects model.
17 
  In a third robustness check we compare only households with the basic CCT 
package with the control. While the standard errors in the later regression are higher 
because of smaller sample sizes, the point estimates are similar. Overall, all three 
alternative fixed effects specification show that child labor decreased substantially more 
for boys than for their female siblings, with the additional reduction in total work about 
1.5 hours.   
  Table 7 re-estimates the model only including households with the productive 
investment package and control households.  Given that the productive investment grant 
might have increased the return to activities in which women specialize, one can wonder 
whether this package led to a shift of girls’ child labor to those activities.  The results first 
show that for this group, child labor for boys decreases significantly more than for girls, 
which appears to be driven by labor in agriculture and livestock. The results also show 
that the productive investment package result in a shift of older girls to nonagricultural 
activities and domestic activities, when compared with their siblings. As a result of both 
these mechanisms, the gender differences are somewhat larger than for the basic package. 
The productive investment package hence appears to reinforce intra-household 
specialization of older girls in nonagricultural activities and domestic work, and shifts 
their labor away from chores. Note that the random effects estimation indicates that the 
overall impact on child labor of older girls is not significant - in fact the sum of the 
coefficients is close to 0  (-1.6 + 1.7). These results suggest that while the productive 
package led to less child labor for younger girls and older boys, it did not significantly 
affect overall child labor of younger boys and older girls.  
  Overall then, these results suggest that the conditional cash transfer helped to 
narrow intra-household gender and age differences in child labor, and older boys in 
                                                 
17 We cannot estimate the fixed effects model with tobit as it would lead to inconsistent coefficient 
estimates.  
  14particular appear to have benefited most.
18 This is consistent with the descriptive 
statistics in table 3 that suggested that school attendance and boys’ work in agriculture 
are negatively correlated with each other. This could indicate that the school 
conditionality, by guaranteeing that children are in school at the moment they otherwise 
would be working in the field is helping compensate for the higher number of hours that 
older boys were working, when compared to their sisters, and their younger siblings.  At 
the same time, there is evidence of increased intra-household specialization of older girls 
in nonagricultural activities and domestic work for households who received the 
productive investment package.  
 
IV.2 Past academic achievement 
We now consider whether the program helped compensate for lags in past 
academic achievement, and in particular whether reductions in child labor are larger for 
children that were lagging behind. The variables we use to measure past academic 
achievement are a dummy variable indicating whether the child was below the grade 
level that corresponds to its age at baseline, and a variable indicating the number of years 
the child was below grade level at baseline. These variables are likely to capture innate 
capabilities, academic skills (or lack thereof), and past disadvantages that might have led 
the children to have lower academic performance than their siblings. For example, a child 
might have been disadvantaged because of a drought shock in early childhood that 
affected his or her cognitive development during a critical stage (see e.g. Alderman, 
Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2006). Such disadvantage might afterwards have been aggravated 
(or not) by resource allocation decisions of the parents. Or children with lower cognitive 
abilities might themselves have been more likely to drop out of school, and therefore 
might have higher child labor participation. On the other hand, parents of children with 
very low abilities might not make them work, as the returns to their work might be very 
low.    
                                                 
18  These findings resonate with findings from the randomized evaluation of the Mexican Progresa 
(Oportunidades) program, as Skoufias and Parker, 2001 show significant reductions in labor participation 
for boys and significant decreases on leisure time for girls. Findings of another CCT program in 
Nicaraguan (Red de Proteccion Social) show larger reductions of child labor for older children (Maluccio, 
2003).    
 
  15  Independently of the reasons why certain children in a household are below grade 
level, it is interesting to see whether parents shifted child labor away from those children 
and as such might help compensate for lags. Table 8 shows the fixed effect estimation 
that accounts for heterogeneity of impacts by past academic achievement and gender.
19 
The results show that boys that were below grade level had a much larger reduction in 
child labor in economic activities, in particular in agriculture when compared to their 
brothers; labor for boys that are at least 1 grade behind reduced with 3 hours per week 
more than labor for other boys.
20 Interestingly however, these boys seem to be shifted 
into domestic work, as compared to their brothers, and as a result the effect is much 
smaller, when considering all hours worked.
21  When considering the nonagricultural 
work, there is some indication that the increase in child labor in this activity is muted for 
children of both genders who are behind grade level. This is consistent with patterns of 
specialization in nonagricultural activities by children with higher schooling levels, as 
shown earlier in the paper.  Other than that, we do not find any significant differences in 
child labor impacts between girls with low versus high past academic achievement.  
  Overall, the results in past academic achievement hence indicate that the program 
did help compensate for past lags, but only for boys. Parents responded to the program by 
reallocating boys with lower skill or ability away from agriculture, but other boys had 
larger reductions in domestic work.   
 
V. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed whether parental decisions in response to a social 
program in rural Nicaragua appear to compensate or reinforce pre-program differences in 
child labor allocation and human capital. The paper shows that the program helped 
                                                 
19 The estimates are robust to inclusion of additional interaction effects of the dummy for older children 
with the gender specific ITT effect, indicating that our proxy for past academic achievement is not just 
capturing an age effect. 
20 This resonates with findings from Edmonds and Schady (2008) from an unconditional cash transfer 
program in Ecuador, showing reduction of child labor for children vulnerable to transitioning from school 
to work, but not for others.  
21 The relative reduction of child labor in economic activity among boys below grade level is even larger 
when considering only households with the productive investment grant. Labor in agriculture, and as a 
result in total economic activity reduces by almost 4 hours, as compared with their brothers at grade level.  
As for the full sample this effect is partially offset by an increase in hours spent in domestic work (results 
available from the authors). 
  16compensate for some of these intra-household differences, but exacerbated others. In 
particular, it reduced total hours worked for older boys, and for boys with low past 
academic achievements, and these results are driven by reductions in agriculture and 
livestock. On the other hand, the productive investment package reinforced existing 
specialization in specific tasks within the household for older girls in particular. Girls in 
households that received the productive investment package are more likely to increase 
work in nonagricultural activities and domestic work, when compared to their siblings. 
This suggests that increased potential for nonagricultural activities in the household 
reinforced specialization by girls in these tasks. At the same, overall child labor did not 
increase for these older girls, suggesting that combining the productive investment 
package with the conditional cash transfer might have been important to avoid an overall 
increase of child labor of girls. 
A possible explanation of these differences in impacts by gender relates to the 
timing of the different activities. Agricultural work tends to be done in the mornings, at 
the same time of classes, while nonagricultural work, domestic work, and chores can be 
done at a time that does not directly compete with class. Moreover, boys’ work in 
agriculture can be substituted for with paid labor, while this is more difficult for the tasks 
in which the girls specialize. The program increased the likelihood of using wage labor in 
agriculture with about 20 % (P-value = 0.024), indicating that such substitution indeed 
might have taken place. On the other hand, the new nonagricultural activities were 
typically small scale and did not involve any wage labor.  
  Given that boys--older boys and boys that had fallen behind in school--before the 
program worked more hours in economic activities compared to their siblings these 
findings suggest that the program helped level the playing field to a certain extent. While 
the paper cannot identify whether it is the cash or the conditionality feature of the 
program design that helped trigger this response, it is consistent with substitution 
between child work in agriculture and schooling, and with the program impacts on school 
enrollment and attendance (see Macours and Vakis, 2008). On the other hand, for both 
genders, child labor in nonagricultural economic activities and schooling appear to be 
complements, even within the household, possibly indicating that the return to children’s 
schooling is higher for such activities, possibly because of low education levels of the 
  17adults. Overall, the findings in this paper suggest that time allocation and specialization 
patterns in child labor within the household are important factors to understand the 
impact of a program, such as Atencion a Crisis, on child labor.  
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  21Table 1: Randomization results
Household Characteristics # Obs.
Age household head 1596 43.65 43.59 44.28 (0.94) (0.50)
Male household head 1597 0.850 0.859 0.875 (0.71) (0.37)
Literate household head 1597 0.618 0.652 0.654 (0.28) (0.36)
# years education household head 1496 2.734 2.721 2.785 (0.94) (0.80)
Household size 1597 6.882 6.918 7.041 (0.83) (0.41)
Number of hh. members under 5 1597 0.804 0.766 0.778 (0.60) (0.74)
Number of hh. members 5-14 1597 2.824 2.919 2.934 (0.16) (0.19)
Number of hh. members 15-24 1597 1.060 1.050 1.081 (0.89) (0.82)
Number of hh. members 25-64 1597 2.039 2.050 2.067 (0.81) (0.63)
Number of hh. members 65 or older 1597 0.143 0.119 0.148 (0.37) (0.87)
Number of rooms in the house 1597 1.652 1.601 1.626 (0.61) (0.81)
Own land 1597 0.681 0.656 0.667 (0.56) (0.76)
Distance to school (min) 1597 0.327 0.261 0.262 (0.10) (0.11)
Distance to health center(min) 1597 1.216 1.156 1.146 (0.70) (0.66)
Distance to municipal headquarters 1597 1.693 1.578 1.623 (0.53) (0.72)
At least one household member active in:
   Self-employment in agriculture 1597 0.911 0.880 0.901 (0.26) (0.73)
   Self-employment in livestock 1597 0.536 0.474 0.488 (0.36) (0.52)
   Wage labor in agriculture 1597 0.592 0.651 0.697 (0.19) (0.04)
   Elaboration food products 1597 0.060 0.075 0.079 (0.50) (0.45)
   Manufacturing (self-employment) 1597 0.036 0.029 0.036 (0.67) (0.97)
   Commercial activities  1597 0.082 0.080 0.066 (0.91) (0.38)
   Services (self-employment) 1597 0.053 0.049 0.056 (0.80) (0.89)
   Wage employment 1597 0.174 0.191 0.191 (0.58) (0.59)
   Skilled wage employment 1597 0.036 0.047 0.056 (0.43) (0.20)
Total consumption per capita (cordoba) 1584 4039 4248 4255 (0.42) (0.47)
Total income per capita (cordoba) 1584 3278 3602 3611 (0.13) (0.23)
Income from agricultural wage labor 1589 2150 1959 2024 (0.49) (0.67)
income for elaboration food products 1590 115.9 120.5 124.4 (0.92) (0.88)
income from commercial activities  1589 175.4 205.7 154.6 (0.62) (0.76)
income from manufacturing (self-employment) 1589 26.97 21.5 30.0 (0.73) (0.86)
Income from services (self-employment) 1590 155.7 125.0 105.0 (0.63) (0.43)
Income from nonagricultural wage labor 1578 681.3 975.6 904.2 (0.12) (0.34)
Income from temporary migration 1592 2663 2838 2432 (0.69) (0.62)
Monetary income from agricultural self-employment 1591 728.5 829.5 865.4 (0.50) (0.41)
Monetary income from livestock 1591 737.1 651.2 558.1 (0.49) (0.20)












  22Table 2: child labor by gender : intrahousehold allocation
non- agriculture& agriculture livestock chores all econ all work
agricultural livestock activity
Boy 0.1725 4.225 3.264 0.929 4.559 1.444 4.488 10.489
Girl 0.261 1.698 0.497 1.166 3.622 3.936 2.049 9.606
Difference -0.0885 2.527 2.767 -0.237 0.937 -2.492 2.439 0.883
P-value 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.190
Table 3: difference in child labor between children assisting to school and those not assisting: intrahousehold allocation
non- agriculture& agriculture livestock chores all econ all work
agricultural livestock activity
ALL
Difference 0.195 -2.962 -2.892 -0.0524 -0.469 -0.502 -2.759 -3.730
P-value (0.083) (0.006) (0.008) (0.720) (0.170) (0.140) (0.013) (0.000)
BOYS
Difference 0.208 -5.971 -5.825 -0.110 -0.318 0.453 -5.744 -5.610
P-value (0.17) (0.002) (0.002) (0.55) (0.54) (0.14) (0.003) (0.002)
GIRLS
Difference 0.185 -0.566 -0.558 -0.00659 -0.588 -1.263 -0.383 -2.234
P-value (0.22) (0.35) (0.35) (0.98) (0.090) (0.009) (0.53) (0.000)
Number of hours per week child between 6 and 15 years worked in :
Number of hours per week child between 6 and 15 years worked in :
domestic 
work
NOTE: Controlling for gender and age through series of age dummies by gender. Control communities only. Results from estimations 
with household fixed effects. Standard errors corrected for clustering at community level. Children 6-15 years old, in households with 
at least 2 children in this age range. N = 1088 (from 413 households)
NOTE: Control communities only. Results from estimations with household fixed effects. Standard errors corrected for clustering at 




  23Table 4: difference in child labor of children below their optimal grade level versus others: intrahousehold allocation
non- agriculture& agriculture livestock chores all econ all work
agricultural livestock activity
ALL
Difference 0.0139 0.220 0.312 -0.101 0.00293 -0.0512 0.210 0.162
P-value (0.90) (0.71) (0.60) (0.39) (0.99) (0.80) (0.74) (0.83)
BOYS
Difference 0.108 0.272 0.309 -0.0382 -0.245 -0.344 0.391 -0.199
P-value (0.51) (0.78) (0.76) (0.80) (0.48) (0.21) (0.70) (0.87)
GIRLS
Difference -0.0820 0.143 0.295 -0.168 0.231 0.220 -0.00201 0.449
P-value (0.47) (0.81) (0.59) (0.35) (0.56) (0.48) (1.00) (0.60)
domestic 
work
Number of hours per week child between 6 and 15 years worked in :
NOTE: Controlling for gender and age through series of age dummies by gender. Control communities only. Results from estimations 
with household fixed effects. Standard errors corrected for clustering at community level. Children 6-15 years old, in households with 
at least 2 children in this age range. N = 980
 
 
  24Fixed Effects Model
COEFFICIENT nr obs/hh non- agriculture & agriculture livestock chores all econ all work
agricultural livestock activity
male*itt 4253/1594 -0.00231 -1.179** -0.824* -0.374** -0.0395 -0.223 -1.256** -1.518**
(0.11) (0.47) (0.45) (0.17) (0.25) (0.27) (0.49) (0.63)
female*age1015*itt 4253/1594 0.209 0.575 0.264 0.311 -0.180 0.663* 0.707 1.191
(0.182) (0.488) (0.447) (0.197) (0.302) (0.350) (0.511) (0.723)
male*age1015*itt -0.0281 -2.786*** -2.014*** -0.805*** -0.154 -0.0823 -2.840*** -3.076***
(0.133) (0.784) (0.725) (0.215) (0.330) (0.234) (0.794) (0.906)
male*itt 0.137 0.743 0.476 0.267 -0.0584 0.217 0.775 0.933
(0.132) (0.542) (0.498) (0.226) (0.380) (0.364) (0.591) (0.883)
P-value female*age1015*itt = male*age1015*itt 0.586 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.909 0.088 0.001 0.000
Random Effects Model
COEFFICIENT nr obs/hh non- agriculture & agriculture livestock chores all econ all work
agricultural livestock activity
male*itt 4253/1594 -0.0580 -1.741*** -1.296*** -0.413*** 0.229 -0.142 -1.755*** -1.478**
(0.11) (0.48) (0.46) (0.15) (0.22) (0.24) (0.52) (0.61)
itt 0.192** -0.104 -0.288** 0.177 -0.707** 0.0735 0.00238 -0.747
(0.090) (0.23) (0.12) (0.19) (0.35) (0.25) (0.26) (0.63)
female*age1015*itt 4253/1594 0.181 -0.0594 -0.0295 0.0467 -0.255 0.810** 0.0364 0.805
(0.151) (0.291) (0.221) (0.201) (0.285) (0.329) (0.344) (0.614)
male*age1015*itt 0.0502 -3.405*** -2.851*** -0.672*** -0.0134 0.163 -3.199*** -3.011***
(0.114) (0.817) (0.782) (0.184) (0.336) (0.194) (0.824) (0.914)
female*itt 0.0864** -0.0664 -0.269*** 0.151 -0.558* -0.399* -0.0165 -1.208**
(0.0434) (0.201) (0.103) (0.166) (0.321) (0.213) (0.219) (0.543)
male*itt 0.106*** 0.117 0.0591 0.153 -0.471 -0.161 0.0917 -0.489
(0.0384) (0.255) (0.183) (0.144) (0.305) (0.176) (0.314) (0.494)
0.529 0.000234 0.00199 0.00407 0.253 0.204 0.000384 0.00115
P-value female*age1015*itt = male*age1015*itt 0.529 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.253 0.204 0.000 0.001
NOTE: Standard errors corrected for clustering at community level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables corrected for gender-specific age trends by regression of 
outcomes in control and on series of age dummies for each gender. All estimates include a gender dummy, and interactions for gender and age. All households with at least 2 children between 6 and 15. 
age1015 is a dummy variable = 1 for children between 10 and 15. Fixed effects model controls for household fixed effects, random effects model controls for household random effects.
Number of hours per week child between 6 and 15 years worked in :
domestic   
work
Table 5: Intrahousehold heterogeneity of impacts by gender and age: all eligible households
Number of hours per week child between 6 and 15 years worked in :
domestic   
work
  25Fixed Effects Models
COEFFICIENT nr obs/hh non- agriculture & agriculture livestock chores all econ all work
agricultural livestock activity
1. Without removing age trends and with age*gender dummies as control
male*itt 4253/1594 -0.0452 -1.060* -0.863 -0.215 -0.102 -0.361 -1.063* -1.527**
(0.123) (0.553) (0.549) (0.169) (0.232) (0.303) (0.564) (0.722)
2. Only households with some child labor
male*itt 4098/1528 0.00914 -1.068** -0.743 -0.345** -0.0312 -0.318 -1.135** -1.483**
(0.116) (0.477) (0.454) (0.173) (0.254) (0.271) (0.491) (0.643)
3. Only households with T1 compared to control
male*itt 2102/798 -0.0495 -0.987 -0.744 -0.294 0.0316 -0.414 -1.110* -1.492**
(0.140) (0.601) (0.583) (0.255) (0.324) (0.353) (0.574) (0.739)
Table 6: Robustness test for intrahousehold heterogeneity of impacts by gender: all eligible households:
Number of hours per week child between 6 and 15 years worked in :
domestic 
work
NOTE: Standard errors corrected for clustering at community level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables in 2nd and 3rd specification corrected for gender-
specific age trends by regression of outcomes in control and on series of age dummies for each gender. All estimates include a gender dummy, and interactions for gender and age, and a 
household fixed effect. All households with at least 2 children between 6 and 15. age1015 is a dummy variable = 1 for children between 10 and 15. 
  26Table 7: Intrahousehold heterogeneity of impacts by gender and age: Beneficiaries from productive investment package versus control
Fixed Effects Model
COEFFICIENT nr obs/hh non- agriculture & agriculture livestock chores all econ all work
agricultural livestock activity
male*itt 2143/806 -0.0680 -1.480** -0.914 -0.558** 0.0654 -0.0643 -1.760** -1.759*
(0.23) (0.62) (0.58) (0.23) (0.35) (0.33) (0.67) (0.93)
female*age1015*itt 2143/806 0.915*** 0.665 0.0801 0.561* -0.245 0.946** 1.527** 2.228**
(0.307) (0.640) (0.585) (0.299) (0.397) (0.431) (0.725) (1.047)
male*age1015*itt 0.0499 -3.319*** -2.404*** -0.910*** -0.390 -0.0754 -3.254*** -3.720***
(0.197) (0.875) (0.807) (0.306) (0.461) (0.324) (0.897) (1.096)
male*itt 0.430* 0.853 0.545 0.300 0.154 0.525 1.031 1.710
(0.247) (0.682) (0.647) (0.286) (0.485) (0.450) (0.782) (1.126)
P-value female*age1015*itt = male*age1015*itt 0.184 0.002 0.031 0.001 0.984 0.177 0.000 0.001
Random Effects Model
COEFFICIENT nr obs/hh non- agriculture & agriculture livestock chores all econ all work
agricultural livestock activity
male*itt 2143/806 -0.205 -1.586*** -1.169** -0.413** 0.482 0.0997 -1.806*** -1.186
(0.19) (0.54) (0.52) (0.19) (0.30) (0.29) (0.59) (0.77)
itt 0.621*** -0.0413 -0.292** 0.265 -0.963*** -0.143 0.539 -0.595
(0.15) (0.26) (0.15) (0.23) (0.37) (0.27) (0.34) (0.67)
female*age1015*itt 2143/806 0.895*** 0.0848 -0.124 0.271 -0.402 1.026*** 0.982** 1.748**
(0.236) (0.362) (0.284) (0.276) (0.355) (0.396) (0.445) (0.794)
male*age1015*itt 0.314** -3.699*** -2.779*** -0.928*** -0.335 0.163 -3.266*** -3.503***
(0.153) (0.867) (0.847) (0.269) (0.449) (0.254) (0.886) (1.068)
female*itt 0.0920 -0.0959 -0.222 0.103 -0.728** -0.746*** -0.0460 -1.631**
(0.0860) (0.273) (0.148) (0.238) (0.350) (0.235) (0.330) (0.669)
male*itt 0.233*** 0.515 0.147 0.389 -0.283 -0.144 0.622 0.241
(0.0805) (0.363) (0.272) (0.243) (0.366) (0.203) (0.435) (0.664)
P-value female*age1015*itt = male*age1015*itt 0.049 0.001 0.007 0.017 0.884 0.015 0.000 0.000
domestic 
work
NOTE: Standard errors corrected for clustering at community level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables corrected for gender-specific age trends by 
regression of outcomes in control and on series of age dummies for each gender. All estimates include a gender dummy, and interactions for gender and age. All households with at 
least 2 children between 6 and 15. age1015 is a dummy variable = 1 for children between 10 and 15. Fixed effects model controls for household fixed effects, random effects model 
controls for household random effects.
Number of hours per week child between 6 and 15 years worked in :
domestic 
work
Number of hours per week child between 6 and 15 years worked in :
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Table 8: Intrahousehold heterogeneity of impacts by past academic achievement : all elegible households
Fixed Effects Model
COEFFICIENT nr obs/hh non- agriculture & agriculture livestock chores all econ all work
agricultural livestock activity
male*at least 1 grade behind 3228/1551 0.108 0.272 0.309 -0.0382 -0.245 -0.344 0.391 -0.199
(0.16) (0.96) (0.99) (0.15) (0.34) (0.27) (1.01) (1.21)
male*at least 1 grade behind*itt -0.332 -2.734** -2.560** -0.132 0.683 0.966*** -3.087** -1.438
(0.21) (1.21) (1.22) (0.29) (0.44) (0.34) (1.27) (1.43)
female*at least 1 grade behind -0.0820 0.143 0.295 -0.168 0.231 0.220 -0.00201 0.449
(0.11) (0.58) (0.54) (0.18) (0.39) (0.31) (0.61) (0.85)
female*at least 1 grade behind*itt -0.232 0.682 0.374 0.328 -0.194 -0.269 0.310 -0.153
(0.22) (0.73) (0.64) (0.27) (0.45) (0.43) (0.74) (1.04)
male*itt -0.158 0.0639 0.401 -0.354 -0.707 -1.452*** -0.266 -2.425**
(0.23) (0.67) (0.71) (0.26) (0.49) (0.50) (0.73) (1.11)
0.745 0.012 0.032 0.232 0.181 0.033 0.016 0.465
male*number grades behind 3192/1543 0.0151 0.218 0.184 0.0174 -0.0145 -0.181** 0.251 0.0555
(0.043) (0.45) (0.47) (0.055) (0.13) (0.076) (0.45) (0.49)
male*number grades behind*itt -0.116* -1.242** -1.081** -0.127 0.120 0.344*** -1.429*** -0.966*
(0.058) (0.50) (0.51) (0.095) (0.15) (0.10) (0.50) (0.54)
female*number grades behind -0.00916 0.105 0.0908 0.0211 0.0909 0.0208 0.110 0.222
(0.045) (0.17) (0.14) (0.084) (0.10) (0.14) (0.18) (0.28)
female*number grades behind*itt -0.123* -0.0632 -0.0531 -0.0234 -0.0392 -0.0648 -0.287 -0.391
(0.068) (0.24) (0.19) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.26) (0.36)
male*itt -0.200 0.514 0.778 -0.355 -0.464 -1.536*** 0.190 -1.810
(0.23) (0.84) (0.84) (0.25) (0.43) (0.53) (0.92) (1.24)
0.941 0.022 0.042 0.441 0.404 0.043 0.033 0.363
NOTE: Standard errors corrected for clustering at community level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables corrected for gender-specific age trends by regression 
of outcomes in control on series of age dummies for each gender using a household fixed effects model. All estimates include gender dummy and household level fixed effects. All households 
with at least 2 children between 6 and 15. Academic achievement measured at baseline. age1015 is a dummy variable = 1 for children between 10 and 15.
P-value female*grbehind*itt = male*grbehind*itt
P-value female*grbehind*itt = male*grbehind*itt
Number of hours per week child between 6 and 15 years worked in :
domestic 
work
 